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REVIEW ARTICLE

Mykhailo Hrushevsky on the rise of Ukrainian Cossackdom: an Ottomanist view

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The name of Mykhailo Hrushevsky (1866-1934) is not one that is familiar to many Ottoman historians. Looking at his work from the vantage point of Ottoman historical scholarship he may appear as one of those vaguely familiar peripheral figures of obscure central or eastern European origin from the period of national revivals, productive and even significant in their time, but today little read and largely forgotten. To naively accept such a view in relation to Hrushevsky and his work, is to compound the considerable historical injustice inflicted on Hrushevsky both before his death and posthumously in his oppressed native land.

Hrushevsky had the luck, as well as the misfortune, to live in interesting times. He was not only the foremost historian of the Ukrainian national revival, an academician both in Habsburg L'viv and tsarist Kyiv, but was also a politician and a polemicist, president of the Central Rada in the short-lived Ukrainian Republic, and as an Academician on the All-Union level a leading figure in the intellectual and scholarly life of the Ukraine and USSR in the first decade of the Soviet regime. Finally, in the 1930s, he fell, the object and at the end a victim of Stalinist paranoia and state persecution. His monumental

* A review article on Mykhailo Hrushevsky, History of Ukraine-Rus', 7: The Cossack Age to 1625, tr. Bohdan Struminski, eds. Serhii Plokhy and Frank Sysyn (Edmonton and Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1999), lxvi + 548 pp., maps., bibl., index, $119.95 (cloth), ISBN 1-895571-28-6.

1 All aspects of Hrushevsky's scholarly and political career are well covered in the excellent study by Thomas M. Prymak, Mykhailo Hrushevsky: the Politics of National Culture (Toronto, 1987).

History of Ukraine-Rus' (Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy) appeared sequentially, first in L’viv, subsequently in Kyiv, in ten volumes between 1898 and 1937 (volume 9 is in two parts). Hrushevsky was still working on it, in the face of the severest personal and intellectual privation and persecution, at the time of his death (a relatively minor medical operation was bungled, most probably on Stalin’s orders). Under the Soviet regime Hrushevsky’s work was suppressed and his reputation vilified; his name could not be mentioned except for purposes of condemnation. Since 1991 in the Ukraine, and even before that in North America, however, Hrushevsky and his work have acquired iconic status as emblems of national resistance and revival. In post-Soviet Kyiv the Istoriia was reissued between 1992 and 1998 in a photo-mechanical reprint (with valuable additional prefatory matter to volume 1); earlier, the financial support of the North American Ukrainian diaspora, coupled with the tireless energy of the Ukrainian-American polyhistorian Omeljan Pritsak, had resulted in a handsome reissue of the entire work in the 1950s under a New York imprint, and subsequently the establishment of the Myxajlo S. Hrushevskyj Chair of Ukrainian History at Harvard University.

Hrushevsky’s other misfortune, which contributed largely to the effective suppression of his work under the Soviets, was that his work represented a potentially fatal threat to a fundamental Russian/Soviet historical myth: the notion that Kyivan Rus’ was the “exclusive cradle of Russian history/culture” (a point well brought out by Charles Halperin in his recent review of volume 1)2. And although Hrushevsky was indeed read (and polemicised against) by Great Russian historians, those who were (and still are) most inconvenienced by the fact that Hrushevsky wrote the Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy in Ukrainian were those scholars from beyond Eastern Europe for whom reading Ukrainian was too difficult or not ‘worth’ the effort. Thus Hrushevsky’s grand presentation of the Ukrainian historical process, which is something very substantial, is mostly missed by better known historiographies, even Russian and Polish, and has been inaccessible to European and world — and one must add here, Ottoman — historians.

This defect is now being remedied. The first two stately volumes of a full translation into English of the *Istorila* have recently appeared, the first fruits of a long-term large-scale collaboration amongst North American, and principally Canadian, Ukrainists and historians. Volume 1 (1898), the first volume of the English translation of the *Istorila* to appear\(^3\), covered the earliest history of the Ukraine down to the foundation of Kyiv Rus’. Its subject matter thus lies well outside the purview of Ottoman (although not of steppe) historians. Volume 7 (originally published in 1909; henceforth referred to as H7), which is here reviewed, does not. The reason for its selection by the series editors as the second volume to appear needs to be mentioned: H7 stands in its own right as volume 1 of what is, in effect, the third cycle of the *Istorila*, which was subtitled by Hrushevsky *The History of the Ukrainian Cossacks (Istoriia Ukrains’koi Kozachchyny)*, which was intended to deal with the history of the Ukraine in the period of the rise and establishment of Cossack hegemony, down through its eventual collapse under both internal and external pressures, from the later fifteenth to the eighteenth centuries. H7 thus discusses in great detail the period from the emergence of the Cossacks, as a third force between the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth on the one side, and the Gireyid lands of the Horde (the so-called Khanate of the Crimea) on the other, in the later part of the fifteenth century, down to 1625. (The succeeding, as yet untranslated, volumes of the subseries become ever more detailed, as the sources available for the study of the Cossack Hetmanate proliferate. Volume 8 (1922), covering the years 1625-50, came out in three parts with separate title pages and paginations (to appear in early 2002); volume 9 also appeared in two parts, totaling 1630 pages, in 1928 and 1931, but covered only the years 1650-7; volume 10/1, which appeared posthumously and was quickly suppressed, had still only reached 1658. The second part of volume 10, which was written but never published, dealt with the period 1658-1676 (the manuscript was deliberately destroyed in Kyiv, some time in the 1970s). The later volumes were never written. For Ottoman historians it must for ever be a matter of regret that Hrushevsky thus was prevented from dealing with the critical years (1677-8) of the massive Ottoman invasion of the Ukraine, where his insights from the Ukrainian side on

the tripartite Ottoman-Muscovite-Polish struggle for the Ukraine and in particular the course of Kara Mustafa Pasha’s epic expedition in 1678 against Chyhyryn (Çehrin) would have been particularly invaluable.

It goes without saying that Hrushevsky was not an orientalist. As a factographic historian *par excellence* he needed the Ottoman chronicles for his account of the Cossacks’ unheralded irruption into the Black Sea, but he was obliged to rely on an elderly Polish translation of Na’ima. It is perhaps worth noticing that Hrushevsky’s chief rival in the affairs of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences during the first decade or so of Soviet rule was another intriguing figure, the Kyiv orientalist Ahatanhel Krymsky (1871-1942), the author, amongst many other works, of an interesting, if quirky *History of Turkey (Istoriia Turechchyny)* (Kyiv, 1924, rp. Kyiv-L’viv, 1996), a work which, for all its outdatedness in terms of Krymsky’s sources, would repay translation into English as a contribution to the study of Ukrainian historiography and Ottoman studies4.

Why then should present-day Ottoman historians concern themselves with Hrushevsky and with a work, the first volumes of which were published more than a century ago? The reasons are complex. Firstly, at the basic level there is the involvement of the Ottomans in the affairs of the Pontic steppe, from the late fifteenth century onwards, an involvement which became ever stronger in the years after 1625, both in the hinterland of Azov in relation to the Don Cossacks and, more significantly for Hrushevsky, the relations between the Ottoman forward post of Özü and the Cossacks of Zaporizhzhia, culminating in the doomed attempt of the Cossack hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky to bring the Hetmanate under Ottoman protection as a refuge between the rock of Polish domination and religious and social discrimination and the hard place of an ever more threatening Muscovite ascendancy.

Secondly, it is Hrushevsky’s work which, at a deep level, underlies and provides sound historical foundation for the efflorescence of Ottoman Pontic and Black Sea studies in recent year, undertaken by scholars such as Bennigsen, Berindei and Veinstein, Inalcik and, Ostapchuk. Thirdly, and most relevantly, it is because Hrushevsky has something original and interesting to say, not only

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4 On Krymsky as a Turkish historian see Omeljan Pritsak, ’Ahatanhel Kryms’kyi ta ioho “Istoriia Turechchay”’, prefixed (pp.5-10) to the 1996 reissue of the work.
about the Ottomans in the period covered by this volume, but in his description
and analysis in compelling detail of the emergence in the eponymous
‘borderland’ of the Ukraine — literally an uc eli — of a border society in
strong contrast to and often in conflict with its settled hinterland. As such,
Hrushevsky’s analysis of Cossack society may provoke a comparison with (and
possibly a validation of) Wittek’s much-criticised border/hinterland and
heterodoxy/High Islam antitheses. Manifestations of this parallel uc-world leap
from almost every page of the present work: settlement, plunder, religion,
solidarity non-ethnic and of random origin; charismatic leaders; frontier
ideology — all the topoi of west Anatolian society in the thirteenth to fifteenth
centuries replicate themselves in the Ukraine in the fifteenth to seventeenth, but
achieving imperial fusion and stasis not from within, with the Ottomans, but
from without, with the Romanovs.

What emerges from the pages of Hrushevsky’s luminous work, then, is a
picture of a society not averse from associating with its Doppelgängers on the
‘other side’ of the frontier zone: the Tatars of the Horde. It is not by chance, as
Hrushevsky admits, that so many important elements of ‘Cossack’ vocabulary,
including the word itself, derive from the Turko-Mongol world of the western
steppes. Clear too is that the Cossacks seem to have been as little liked and
trusted by many of their fellow-Christians of the hinterland — in this case the
Polish-Lithuanian crown and its Polish and Ukrainian colonising nobiliary elite
(as strongly brought out by Hrushevsky), whose interests they were pledged to
defend, but who frequently treated them shamefully — as had been the uc begis
by the waxing power of the Ottoman sultanate a century and more earlier. In
effect, matters often resolved themselves into a Polish-Ottoman stitch-up, e.g. in
the settlement of the Polish field-commander Zolkiewski’s stand-off with the
Ottoman serdar Ibrahim Pasha in September 1617, which led to the Polish-
Ottoman treaty of Iaruhu (Jaruga/Busza), 23/9/1617: ‘the Cossack bandits are

5 Cf., for a recent discussion of the Ottoman frontier, Colin Heywood, ‘The Frontier in
Ottoman History: Old Ideas and New Myths’, in: Daniel Power and Naomi Standen (ed.),
6 In Turkish: Kazak e_kiyası; cf. now Dariusz Kolodziejczyk, Ottoman-Polish Diplomatic
Relations (15th - 18th century): An Annotated Edition of ‘Ahdnames and other
Documents (Leiden, 2000), which publishes both the Polish (doc. 31, pp. 345-8) and the
Turkish (doc. 32, pp. 349-53) version, from a copy in the Ecnebi defterleri; the text of
Art. I adds: ‘...or [to send] imperial troops by land. And we [the Poles] promise and
engage to suppress and punish the Cossacks’.
not to go to sea from the Dnipro, and are not to do any damage in the imperial [scil. Ottoman] lands: in general they should be destroyed in some way, so that there will be no more damage either from us [scil. the Poles] or from the Cossacks, and the imperial [Ottoman] fleet will no longer need to go to the Black Sea’ (p. 281).

On reading Hrushevsky, the big question that poses itself, at least in the mind of this reviewer, may be formulated somewhat as follows: was ‘Cossackdom’, as described by Hrushevsky, a Christian equivalent of a ghazi confederacy, with as much (or as little) to do with the ‘real’ Christian hinterland of Kyiv and L’viv (or even Cracow or Moscow) as the ghazis had to do with, say, Konya (or even Damascus or Cairo)? Certainly the Cossack hetmans of the later sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, including perhaps the most intriguing figure to emerge from this volume, that of the hetman Petro Konashevych-Sahaidachny, remind one greatly, at a remove of two or three centuries, of the begs of the Rumelian uc, ‘knightly warriors’ (the translator’s term for *rytsari*, who were at once both alf and ghazi). Konashevych-Sahaidachny, who destroyed the Ottoman Black Sea fleet in 1616, capturing a dozen galleys and 100 boats, and going on to attack the coast of the Crimea, burn Kefe and liberate a mass of slaves in an action reminiscent of Umur Beg three centuries earlier, was commemorated in laudatory funeral verses that might, in a different context, have come from the pen of Ahmed:

During his hetmancy he captured the town of Kaffa in Turkey,
So that the Turkish emperor himself knew great fear,
For he killed fourteen thousand of his people there.
He burned down some galleys and sank others.
He then freed many Christians from slavery,
For which God blessed him and his army (p. 277).

Later that year Sahaidachny ravaged Trabzon and attacked and routed the Ottoman fleet under ‘Chikala pasha, a Genoese admiral [sic]’ — surely this was *akın*, if not Christian ghaza, on the grand scale, and a phenomenon with which the by then bureaucratised and centrally controlled Ottoman fleet and military could not cope.
In this context, it is worth emphasising that the conditions of war and the *manière de combattre* were similar on both sides. Here is Bernard Pretwicz, one of the most bellicose of the Polish frontier commanders of the mid-sixteenth century, summing up in a report to the Sejm the end-game of a series of steppe encounters with the Tatars circa 1540: 'then I went against them [the Tatars — CH], defeated them there and took many alive, slaughtered and trampled their children and wives, taking revenge for our wrongs. And I took more than five hundred of their horses'. How reminiscent this is of the *mentalités* of the Horde.

How then did Cossackdom emerge? Hrushevsky’s analysis is detailed and complex, and has some relevance as a tool to a deeper understanding of Anatolian and Rumelian ghazi society. The rise of Cossackdom Hrushevsky attributes to a reaction against the Horde’s raids into Poland-Lithuania’s Ukrainian borderlands and even the hinterland, from the late fifteenth century onwards. In part, according to Hrushevsky, the impetus was a positive one, economic in its motivation, the Cossack raids in the opposite direction, initially foraging expeditions, pushing ever deeper into the steppe, turned into skirmishes with the Tatars, then into looting and guerrilla warfare (p. 43). Thus we have a reminder, from a different but parallel milieu, of the economic importance of *akın* in the Ottoman context, the evidence for which is so much to the fore, e.g. in Ashikpashazade’s or, a century and a half later, in Pechevi’s accounts of the immense profitability of slaving expeditions in the Ottoman borderlands — trade was carried out arms in hand.

What sort of a histarian was Hrushevsky? Frank Sysyn, in his illuminating introduction to the English translation of volume 1, stresses (p. xxxv) Hrushevsky’s ‘constant attention to historical sources and their analysis’. In one sense, therefore, he was a neo-Rankean, in his dedication to the sources, in his methodology (factography enlivened by discussion and reflection), and in the national framework adopted for his major work. In another sense, however, he was far more of a populist than Ranke ever was or could be. This was a stance deriving from both his own intellectual roots, and from the circumstances of his time. In other ways, Hrushevsky was a product of the nineteenth-century

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7 J. T. L[ubomirski], ‘Bernard Pretwicz i jego epologia na Sejmie 1550 r.’, *Biblioteka Warszawska* (1866), no. 3, 44-59, condensed translation in H7, 49.
German tradition of philologically-based, essentially sceptical scholarship. 'In my time', he wrote as a young professor for his inaugural lecture at L'viv in 1894, 'I have gone through the school of philology and firmly established the principle based on it: nemini credere .... Scholarship is scepticism without end'8.

In this sense Hrushevsky was a demythologiser, in particular in relation to the earlier historians of the Cossacks. In fact the emergence, before Hrushevsky’s time, of a romantic view of Cossack history — its discovery, even — seems as a phenomenon to have had much in common with the reinvention of Scottish history under the stress of final defeat by a neighbouring but infinitely more powerful state: the ‘romantic’ Highlander, like the romantic Cossack, were equally products of defeat (Killiecrankie and the ‘45 / Poltava) and absorption, the elements of mythohistory and reinvention being at their strongest at the period of greatest political powerlessness, in the early nineteenth century (Sir Walter Scott / Shevchenko). But Scotland, of course, never produced a Hrushevsky....

If Wittek mythologised the ghazis, Hrushevsky demythologised the Cossacks. In an aside pregnant with significance for the current debate on the Witteklian ‘ghazi thesis’, Hrushevsky observes (p. 304): ‘Yet we know of the Cossacks’ inclination to cloak their border hunt for booty in the idealistic garb of a struggle “against the enemies of the Holy Cross”’, and adds of ‘those fine boys, Messieurs Zaporozhians’ (slavni khloptsi, Pany Zaporoztsi) — as a contemporary folksong defined them — the telling observation that ‘... even a wild freebooter (zdychilyi dobychnyk) who, when the need arose, would be equally unsparing of his coreligionist, an Orthodox Muscovite or Belarusian, as of a Muslim, found it pleasant to sense a higher mission in Cossack life, [and] to have some ideological framework for his rampages in the steppe borderland [reviewer’s italics]’. One might be tempted to dismiss this as little more than a reflection of Hrushevsky’s essentially populist and secular views, but in fact, already by the seventies of the nineteenth century, Ukrainian historians had clashed over the traditional view, put forward by historians such as Mykola Kostomarov (1817-85), that the early Cossacks were some sort of champions of

8 M. Hrushevsky, ‘Vstupayi vyklad z davnoi istorii Rusy’ (1894), 150, cited in H7, p. xxix, n. 10.
the [Orthodox] faith. Kostomarov was opposed by, for example, his contemporary Panteleimon Kulish (1819-85), who pointed out the total groundlessness of any transfer of the ostensibly fervent religious elements found amongst the Zaporozhian Cossacks in the mid-18th century to the ‘wild frontier’ which was Zaporizhzhia in the 15th and 16th centuries. It may not, therefore, be too fantastical to observe in the present context that the demythologising insights which Kulish was able to achieve *circa* 1870 in respect of the Cossack frontier seem only to have been apprehended in terms of the Ottoman *uc* and its ‘wild freebooters’ in the course of the last few years.

In fact, it is clear from H7 (p. 309) that the Cossacks’ first intervention in religious affairs (in defence of Orthodoxy and against the Polish-controlled Uniate hierarchy in the Ukraine -- and not against the Tatars or the Ottomans, be it noted) dates from 1609, after which the Cossacks were increasingly taken over by the hinterland and adopted and even coopted as defenders of Orthodox ideology. By 1621, the year in which Sahaidachny signed up the entire Cossack Host into the religiously-ascendant Kyivan Brotherhood, the new ideology was in place: in a fulminating memorandum, the Orthodox bishops of the Ukraine could state (p. 307) that ‘...it is God who placed the Tatars on earth like lightning bolts and thunder to afflict and punish Christians with them. Similarly, he has placed the Cossacks of the lower Dnipro region, the Zaporozhian Cossacks, and the Don Cossacks, like other lightning bolts and thunder, on land and sea, to frighten and rout the infidel Turks and Tatars...’. An interesting question in this context is: do the Cossacks, *circa* 1609-21, ‘take over’ (or buy into) the idea of Ukraine in a religious-political sense, against the Poles (border > hinterland), in contrast to the Ottoman ulama’s Islamisation of the aknclar tradition from the time of Neshri, if not earlier (hinterland > border)?

Why should there be this dyschronicity — admittedly of no more than between a quarter and a half century — between, say, Kulish, and later Hrushevsky, on the one side and Wittek on the other, in terms of their historical perception? It would not be too simplistic to observe that, in this context, Wittek was writing from outside; Hrushevsky from inside of his chosen society, and

9 Cf. Prymak, *Hrushevsky*, 13, for valuable indications of Kostomarov’s strong intellectual influence on the young Hrushevsky.

thus, thanks also to the essential conservatism of the Ottoman historical establishment, the ‘ghazi theory’ has had a longer run than its Cossack equivalent.

Again unlike Wittek, who romanticised both the departed Habsburgs and the Ottomans, Hrushevsky’s obsession in H7 (and its successors) was that of a national historian, writing what he termed ‘a history of this new national force and...of its struggle against the hostile Polish regime...’. No doubt, had he been able to carry on his work beyond the mid-seventeenth century, his focus would have been on the even more hostile forces of Muscovite (and, later, Russian) imperialism from the treaty of Pereiaslav onwards. As such, the steppe and the Ukraine’s eastern and southern neighbours, the Ottomans and the Horde, would have paid, at least ideologically speaking, a secondary role.

In fact, Hrushevsky’s attitude to the steppe world and to Islam as cultural forms, or to the Ottoman state or the Horde under the Gireys, appears to have attracted little attention from historians. It is a particular matter for regret that the long article on Hrushevsky as a historian (‘Istoriosofia M. Hrushevs’koho’), by the doyen of Ukrainian steppe historians, Omeljan Pritsak, which is prefixed to volume 1 of the 1992 Kyiv reprint of the Istoriia11, has nothing to say on the matter, although the parallels between the Cossacks and what the translator editor terms ‘Turkish grenzlers and Hungarian haiducks’ had already been pointed out by Hrushevsky’s student Myron Korduba, in an article published in the Zeitschrift für osteuropäische Geschichte as long ago as 1912. In part, as is pointed out in the editor of H7’s useful note on p. xlvii, this was due to the limitations of Hrushevsky’s sources. Three major archival repositories for the history of Ukraine-Rus’ in this period were inaccessible to him: those of the Vatican (exploited only from the 1950s), Istanbul (with a few previous exceptions opened to foreign scholars only after 1950), and Moscow (as opposed to, e.g., manuscripts and documents in the St. Petersburg Public Library and other Russian collections).

Nonetheless, on certain specific aspects of Ottoman policy on their northern frontier Hrushevsky can be illuminating. Instance may be made of his detailed and useful account of the Khotyn (Hotin) campaign of 1621 (pp. 360-

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75), a subject which still lacks monographic treatment from the Ottoman side. (Here I may be permitted to throw in my recollection of one promising North American graduate student, whose name and university alas are by now forgotten, but whom I encountered in Istanbul in the late 1970s. His research proposal for a study of the reign of Osman II and of the Khotyn campaign was first stalled and finally turned down by the Turkish authorities as being too politically — and, by implication, religiously — sensitive.)

Equally valuable is Hrushevsky’s detailed, almost monographic treatment (pp. 405-30) of the episode of the ‘false Yahya’, an individual cast in the mould of would-be throne-claimants in the Byzantine-Ottoman-Muscovite tradition, stretching down through Düzme Mustafa to the False Dmitry. Alexander Yahya was an adventurer claiming to be a son of Mehmed III and a grandson of Murad II; his mother was alleged to be a member of the family of the Comneni. In Hrushevsky’s account, Yahya originally lived with his father in Asia Minor. When Murad III died in 1595, and Mehmed III succeeded, Yahya’s mother allegedly stole out of the harem and fled to Macedonia. There she reverted to the Orthodox faith and baptised her son as Aleksandar. When the lad turned fifteen she sent him to the mad Holy Roman Emperor Rudolf. From this event Yahya’s endless odyssey began, culminating in plans for a grand coalition against the Ottomans, drawing in the Cossacks, Muscovy, the khan of the Crimea and various west European rulers — in name if not in fact a broad Orthodox coalition, intended also against the Poles. Funding (from Florence) never arrived, and the affair degenerated into farce and fiasco, the ‘great alliance’ reduced to a Cossack maritime expedition launched in 1625 (p. 416-7). Yahya ended up in Muscovy. Hrushevsky’s main source for the entire episode is Yahya’s alleged autobiography, set down forlov, the metropolitan of Kyiv, and an account presented to ‘the tsar’s people’, edited by Kulish in the later nineteenth century.

H7 ends with the tumultuous events of 1625: the proposed Cossack-Girey alliance — a prospect much feared by the Poles and the Ottomans — came to nothing for the time being: the Cossacks were defeated, humiliated and brought to heel by the Poles under Koniecpolski12; Yahya was smuggled to the outside

12 It would be revived by 1627 only to be broken up by a dramatic Ottoman intervention in the following year (see Mykhailo Hrushev’s'kyi, Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy, 8: [Kyiv, 1922], pp. 42-56).
world via Moscow (where he was detained) and Archangel. The Orthodox coalition against the Ottomans proved to have been equally abortive, and the Ukrainian-Cossack ‘entity’ was, again for the time being, no longer independent of Polish control.

What stays in mind after reading H7? One may be tempted to adopt a Burckhardtian stance: it was a misfortune that a Ukrainian state, based on the Cossack Hetmanate, failed to take enduring root in the late sixteenth/early seventeenth century, as a buffer between the Poles and the Tatars, as an obstacle to Muscovite expansion, and as an antemurale to the Ottomans... However such a stance, essentially stemming from post-eighteenth-century hindsight, suffers from the teleological fallacy and only obscures the complex convolutions of Ukrainian history in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Indeed by the middle of the seventeenth century the Revolution of 1648 and protracted Cossack-Polish war that followed did result in the establishment of a Cossack Hetmanate polity which lasted with diminishing autonomy (e.g. its own administrative and legal system and army) until liquidated by Catherine II with the destruction and abolition of the Zaporozhian Sich in 1775.

The dustcover of this volume reproduces a modern reworking of a 17th-century engraving of the Cossack hetman Petro Sahaidachny, done in the year of his death (1622). In a cartouche is a representation of the hetman’s personal tamgha, in the shape of a horseshoe surmounted by a cross. It may not be too fanciful to see in it a Christianised reworking of the tamgha of Nogay Khan, the able and many-sided Chinghizid Heerkonig who dominated the Ukrainian steppe in the last third of the thirteenth century. Nogay Khan, despite his military skills and political genius, his relations with states as far apart as Hungary and the Mamluk sultanate, when faced with the greater power of the Saray khans of the Horde, failed in the end to establish a lasting and a durable polity. It is not the least of the merits of H7 that reading it leaves one anxiously waiting for the imminent appearance of H8, which will deal with the succeeding decades down to 1650, when the Cossack Hetmanate did indeed take root and become, for a time, an autonomous polity.\(^{13}\)

\(^{13}\) On the Ottoman aspect of these momentous events, see Omeljan Pritsak, ‘Das erste Türkisch-Ukrainische Bündnis (1648)’, *Oriens* vi (1953), 266-98.
It only needs to be added that the work of editing and translating H7 into English garb has been done with a very high degree of scrupulosity. This is shown in such details as the use of a different typeface for Hrushevsky’s original footnotes and for those, mainly explanatory, ones inserted by the editor and in, for example, the provision of a detailed and skillfully arranged bibliography (pp. 471-501), which was lacking in the original, and which has been updated through editorial additions to the series of bibliographical notes (pp. 440-7) with which Hrushevsky rounded off his work. It is not going too far to state that the English version of H7, with the added apparatus and the cleaning up and clarifications of Hrushevsky’s footnotes, making them both more systematic and more complete, is clearly superior to the original Ukrainian edition of 1909. Ukrainists, and not Ottomanists, will have to decide whether or not it supersedes the Ukrainian original, for which an updating in its original language would seem to an outsider to be a desideratum.