The Deposition of Defterdār Aḥmed Pasha and the Rule of Law in Seventeenth-Century Egypt

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I would like to thank the Leverhulme Trust, the Harvard Islamic Legal Studies Program and the Koç University Research Center for Anatolian Civilizations for funding the research and writing of this article. I have benefited from the opportunity to present different versions of this research at several seminars and conferences, and I am grateful to organizers and audiences at: Harvard Law School, the Koç Research Center for Anatolian Civilizations, Zentrum Moderner Orient, the School of Oriental & African Studies, Michael Gilsenan's workshop on Islamic Law in Society at New York University, and Kent Schull and Safa Saracoğlu's panel at the 2013 Middle East Studies Association meeting in New Orleans. I would also like to thank Baki Tezcan and Mark Philp for reading drafts of the final article.

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Defterdār Aḥmed Pașa’nın Azli ve XVII. Yüzyılda Mısır’da Hukuk Devleti


Anahtar kelimeler: Osmanlı Mısırı, Şiriet Mahkemeleri, İstan, Köprüllü islahatları

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On 18 February 1676, the Ottoman governor of Egypt Defterdār Aḥmed Pasha was deposed by a group of Cairene soldiers opposed to the fiscal and administrative reforms he had attempted. The soldiers, who were drawn from all seven of Cairo’s regiments, forcibly removed him from the citadel and placed him under house arrest before demanding that the Sultan appoint a new governor. Conflict between soldiers and governors was common during the seventeenth century in Egypt and throughout the Ottoman provinces, as was conflict between soldiers and the imperial government in the capital Constantinople. The event of February 1676 was only one of several depositions of governors of Egypt that took place during that century. It is, however, an unusually well-documented deposition. Among the surviving sources is a ḥuṣṣa (legal certificate) which shows that the soldiers began a legal action at a Cairo court seventeen days after the deposition. This legal action attempted to constrain the actions of future governors: it constituted a further act of resistance to Defterdār Aḥmed Pasha’s reform program. The soldiers not only believed that they had a right of legitimate rebellion, they also believed that the Ottoman governor’s authority was limited by law, and they were able to use Ottoman legal institutions to enforce these limits.

In this article I use a close reading of this rebellion and the subsequent court case to illustrate the increasing significance of law and legal institutions in Ottoman politics during the seventeenth century. The court ḥuṣṣa is a rare example of this type of document, because the registers of the institution that produced it have not survived from any period prior to 1741. Reading this document together with several contemporary accounts of the deposition that

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1 The seven regiments in Cairo were the Janissaries (usually called Mustahfiẓān in Arabic sources), the Ṭeṣbās, the Gönüllüyān, the Čerākīs, the Çavuşān, the Müteferrika and the Tüfekçīyān.

2 Historians working on Ottoman court records almost exclusively use the registers containing copies of the ḥuṣṣās issued by the courts, rather than the ḥuṣṣās themselves. The register was the court’s official archive and so was preserved by the institution; the ḥuṣṣās issued to individuals were dispersed and so mostly lost. For reasons that are unclear, the registers of the court where this case took place, al-Dīwān al-ʿAlī in the Cairo citadel, were almost all lost, probably long before the creation of the Egyptian National Archive where the few surviving registers now reside. The earliest surviving register dates from 1741-3, and only a handful of ḥuṣṣās from dates earlier than this have survived: to my knowledge, seven in the Egyptian National Archive and five in the Prime Ministry Archive in Istanbul. The loss of these records is particularly unfortunate because on the basis of the surviving records it appears that the Dīwān al-ʿAlī was where many of the contracts and disputes of the political elite were conducted.
preceded it provides a unique opportunity to see how one of Cairo’s frequent political upheavals was played out within the courts. The court case allows us to see the rebellions that punctuated seventeenth-century Ottoman history in a new light: as part of the development of a concept of the rule of law in the early modern Ottoman Empire. The urban social groups represented by soldiers had long believed in their rights, and had often asserted them when they felt that the government threatened their interests. But traditionally, these rights had been understood in terms of a patrimonial bond of mutual obligation between the Sultan as master and the soldiers as his slaves. This bond was expressed symbolically, in particular through practices surrounding food. The Janissaries of Constantinople indicated their displeasure with the Sultan by turning over their soup-cups or by removing the cauldron from the regimental kitchen: by refusing the Sultan’s food, they signaled that the tacit contract between them was broken. The incident I discuss here demonstrates the rise of an alternative idiom of political negotiation that was legal rather than patrimonial. This legalistic political discourse suited the changed circumstances of the seventeenth-century empire, in which the social base of the ruling class had broadened and slavery was no longer central to political hierarchy. The emergence of a rule of law was key to the transformation of the Ottoman Empire from a patrimonial monarchy into an early modern bureaucratic state.

The frequent rebellions of soldiers in Constantinople and provincial cities during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries have played an important role in Ottoman historiography. Older works written within the “Ottoman decline” paradigm saw the rebellions as examples of the corruption of the once-mighty Janissary army and of the weakening of the Ottoman government’s control of its


4 Slavery remained widespread within political society in Egypt and the central regions of the Ottoman Empire in the seventeenth century: the imperial household and the households of notables included many slaves. But slavery was no longer the paradigmatic political relationship. Households consisted of diverse types of relationship, of which slavery was only one. This was true in Egypt as much as the central regions; on the inapplicability of the “Mamluk” label to Ottoman-Egyptian households, see Jane Hathaway, “The Military Household in Ottoman Egypt,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 27 (1995), 39-52.
provinces. More recent historians have dispensed with the discredited decline paradigm, and have examined rebellions as struggles between different elements of the ruling establishment over status and revenues.

In all cities of the Ottoman Empire, there was a great deal of overlap between the military and the commercial classes: from the mid-sixteenth century on, soldiers increasingly took up trades to supplement salaries that had been eroded by inflation, while urban merchants and artisans increasingly sought regimental affiliation in order to benefit from tax breaks and protection. It is therefore misleading to understand the rebellions of soldiers as “mutinies,” as the word suggests that the issue was one of military discipline. Most of the rebellions by soldiers of this period, including the Cairo rebellion discussed here, had little to do with military concerns and instead centered on other aspects of government policy or on factional conflict. These rebellions were assertions of power by a particular social class: urbanites of moderate wealth.

While they cannot be called “mutinies,” these rebellions by soldiers must be distinguished from the “popular” revolts of the urban masses, which have been studied by numerous historians in the context of Ottoman Egypt and Syria. The

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7 Nevertheless the word “mutiny” has frequently been used in modern scholarship to describe these events: e.g. Jane Hathaway (ed.), *Mutiny and Rebellion in the Ottoman Empire*; Marinos Sariyannis, “Rebellious Janissaries: Two Military Mutinies in Candia (1688, 1762) and their Aftermaths,” in *The Eastern Mediterranean under Ottoman Rule: Crete 1645-1840*, ed. A. Anastasopoulos (Rethymno: Crete University Press, 2008), 255-74.

8 For example: André Raymond, “Quartiers et mouvements populaires au Caire au XVIIIème siècle,” in *Political and Social Change in Modern Egypt: Historical Studies from the Ottoman Conquest to the United Arab Republic*, ed. P. M. Holt (London: Oxford
popular revolts were not organized by or around the military class and its institutions, although some lower-ranking soldiers may have participated in them as individuals. The urban crowd that led the typical popular revolt did not represent the interests of the military class; indeed it often protested against the military class’s abuse of its privileges. And the language used by contemporary chroniclers to narrate popular revolts was different. Terms such as al-‘āmma (the masses), with their condescending overtones, were not applied to rebellions by soldiers, who were called al-‘askar (the military), the ehl-i Mṣṭr (people of Egypt) or Mṣīrlūyān (Egyptians).9

Cemal Kafadar and Baki Tezcan have analyzed Janissary rebellions as social movements.10 Focusing on the rebellions that took place in Constantinople over the course of the seventeenth century, both have portrayed the rebellions as the assertion of the rights of the social group that the Janissaries represented: a group which increasingly converged with the middling merchant and artisan class. The Janissaries believed that the Sultan’s authority over them was governed by norms, and they rebelled when they thought that the Sultan or his ministers had violated these norms. Kafadar portrays the Janissaries’ understanding of their relationship with the Sultan as a contract of allegiance which imposed rights and duties on both parties: an image which fits with the patrimonial model of Ottoman governance. Either side would use violence if it felt the contract had been breached: this led to a cycle of revolt and repression throughout the seventeenth century. Tezcan argues that the seventeenth century saw the Ottoman Empire transform from a patrimonial system into a limited monarchy governed by law. He claims that the Janissaries came to believe that there were legal limitations on the authority of

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9 The Turkish adjective Mṣīrlū (Egyptian), in a similar way to Osmani (Ottoman), was reserved for members of the military class, and excluded the civilian population of Egypt.

the Sultan: that they were constitutionalists. Tezcan’s emphasis on law is intriguing, but it rests on Tezcan’s analysis of seventeenth-century chronicles and the prominent role in the rebellions that they accord to the ulema; he does not use any legal treatises or documents.

The deposition of Defterdär Aḥmed Pasha in 1676 lends support to Tezcan’s claim that law became central to relations between the imperial government and the military class during the seventeenth century. The surviving ḥujja provides documentary evidence that disputes about the nature of the relationship between the imperial government and the military class, and about the limits of the government’s authority, were fought and negotiated in the empire’s courts. This ḥujja allows us to begin to examine the contours of this emerging conception of the rule of law. The document is not a constitution: it is not a foundational document setting out a comprehensive set of norms for the conduct of government. Rather, it is a snapshot of a particular moment when certain such norms were being asserted. Although there was no formal constitution, the soldiers who participated in this court case displayed a *constitutional sensibility*: they believed that there were rules for the conduct of government, and that courts were the place to assert and enforce these rules. Law, for my purposes here, consisted primarily of legal institutions and procedures rather than legal doctrine. The soldiers turned to a court of law and used legal procedures to assert their rights. They did not refer directly to legal doctrine; rather, as we shall see, they used legal procedures to create legal doctrines, by giving legal authority to particular customs.

At the same time, the patrimonial model of a tacit contract between Sultan and soldiers described by Kafadar was still current in the late seventeenth century. The emergence of the rule of law did not immediately eclipse older modes of political engagement. Rather, both political idioms coexisted: the disgruntled soldiers of Cairo resorted to patrimonial and legalistic claims on a pragmatic basis in order to pursue their interests.11

The idea of the rule of law has played a prominent role in recent Ottoman historiography. As historians have rejected Oriental despotism as a model for the Ottoman state, they have focused on how Ottoman courts were a key resource for Ottoman subjects seeking to resist abusive behavior by government

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11 The patrimonial idiom was also very much alive in the popular revolts described by Raymond, Baer, Burke and Grehan. Although the demand for “justice” was at the center of such revolts, the protesters conceived justice as emanating from the goodwill of the Sultan, rather than as embedded in legal procedures.
officials.\textsuperscript{12} What has emerged from this body of scholarship is, however, a weak version of the rule of law. In this model, abuse is committed by provincial officials who exceed the authority granted to them, and the law is a mechanism that allows the imperial government to monitor and discipline these officials. In other words, law is a solution to the classic principal-agent problem inherent in any complex polity: officials do not always follow the commands of the government, and so the government must create mechanisms to correct the resulting injustices and to encourage compliance with its orders.\textsuperscript{13} The model assumes that while provincial officials are corruptible, the imperial government is essentially just. This understanding of the role of law in Ottoman governance reflects the state-centric bias in Ottoman historiography, and replicates the concept found in Ottoman-Islamic political theory of the “circle of justice,” according to which all justice emanates from the Sultan who must cultivate it in order to preserve his rule.\textsuperscript{14} The model also assumes that the divide between \textit{askerî} and \textit{re'âyâ}, the ruling class and the subject class, was as salient in social life as it was in Ottoman political discourse.

The archival evidence establishes beyond doubt that Ottoman subjects used the courts to bring abuses committed by officials to the government’s attention. But as a paradigm for the rule of law in the Ottoman Empire, I find it limited, for two main reasons. First, within this model the imperial government sets the rules


\textsuperscript{13} This principal-agent problem can be particularly acute in authoritarian regimes, hence the corruption endemic in many modern states in the Arab world. It can lead to rule of law institutions being fostered and supported, if less than whole-heartedly, by these authoritarian regimes. For a fascinating account of the relationship between courts and the Mubarak regime in Egypt, see Tâmir Moustafa, \textit{The Struggle for Constitutional Power: Law, Politics and Economic Development in Egypt} (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

\textsuperscript{14} On the antiquity of this concept in the Middle East see Linda Darling, \textit{A History of Social Justice and Political Power in the Middle East: The Circle of Justice from Mesopotamia to Globalization} (New York: Routledge, 2013).
and remains above scrutiny. The legal system is the government’s tool, and there is nothing external to the government that can constrain its actions: this is a weak version of the rule of law. Second, it ignores a crucial component of the history of the rule of law in other societies. In other historiographies, relations between the monarch and the elites, rather than relations between the state and ordinary subjects, are central to the story: in English historiography it is the barons, not the peasants, who force Magna Carta on King John. This aspect of the rule of law has been neglected by Ottoman historiography, due to the enduring allure of the classical paradigm of Ottoman governance in which the ruling class were the Sultan’s slaves: slaves who did not receive the full protection of the law. It is this aspect of the rule of law that interests me.

**The Political Structure of Ottoman Egypt**

Here I give a brief overview of the political structure of Ottoman Egypt in the late seventeenth century, so that non-specialists may make sense of the dispute between Defterdâr Aḥmed Pasha and the soldiers.\(^\text{15}\) The imperial government was represented in Egypt by a governor, who held the rank of Pasha. Governors were appointed from among the imperial elite and generally served terms of one to three years before being rotated to another province or to a position in the capital. The governorship of Egypt was a prestigious position within the imperial hierarchy, and several governors also served as Grand Vizier before or after their postings to Egypt. The governor of Egypt was therefore an outsider: unlike in some other provinces, local or localized elites did not manage to take control of this post during the seventeenth or early eighteenth centuries. The governor was based in the citadel, which sits atop the Muqāṭṭam hill that was then at the southeastern boundary of the city of Cairo. He brought with him only a small personal entourage, and he could govern effectively only by cooperating with the other two centers of power in Egypt: the military households and the regiments.

The households were patronage networks formed through military slavery (the mamlūk system), kinship and other types of patron-client relations. They were headed by powerful men, some of whom were manumitted mamlūks. Many,

but not all, household heads held the rank of bey.16 The beys monopolized the high offices in the provincial administration, including the posts of amir al-hājj (commander of the pilgrimage) and deşterdâr (treasurer), and the governorships of the sub-provinces. They also controlled the major rural tax-farms and many of the large awqāf (endowments). These positions were the main sources of their wealth.

There were seven regiments in Egypt, the largest of which were the Janissaries and the ‘Azebân. The regiments were institutions that had been implanted by the Ottomans. However, by the late seventeenth century, in connection with their interpenetration with the merchant and artisan communities, the regiments had developed strong corporate identities and would mobilize to defend their corporate interests. Although they took part in Ottoman wars, provided police functions within Cairo, and assisted in the pacification of the Egyptian countryside, the regiments cannot be regarded solely as military organizations: they were also entitlement groups that existed to defend their members’ privileges and interests.17 The regiments controlled the sources of wealth that the beys did not – the urban tax-farms and the customs-farms at the ports – and regimental officers profited greatly from the coffee trade. The households and regiments should not be seen as separate groups; rather, they were different loci around which power coalesced, and they overlapped with one another. Many regimental soldiers were affiliated with a household; some regimental officers led their own households; beys sought to influence the regiments by placing their protégés in key positions.

Before proceeding it is also worth reflecting briefly on the “local” nature of this military society in Egypt. The beys and soldiers identified as Egyptians, or Misrīluyân. But this word did not correspond with either ethnic identity or geographical origin. This society was diverse and included slaves from Georgia and Abkhazia, mercenaries and officials from Anatolia and the Balkans, and even the odd European renegade, as well as people born in Egypt. There was a lot of money to be made in seventeenth-century Egypt, due to its agricultural wealth and its position on the coffee and spice trade routes: this made it a magnet for ambitious immigrants. Members of this military society identified as Egyptians because Egypt was where they made their careers. Their use of this marker did not imply any particular identification with the wider population of the province,

16 The title bey was a short form of şancağbeyi. Unlike in most other regions of the Ottoman Empire, in Egypt the title did not correspond to control of any particular territory. The number of beys in Egypt was, however, limited to 24 at any one time.
17 See Wilkins, Forging Urban Solidarities, for a detailed analysis of how the Janissaries of seventeenth-century Aleppo operated as an entitlement group.
and it certainly did not indicate any commitment to autonomy or independence. The ongoing struggles between Egypt’s soldiers and Ottoman governors were over apportioning rights and resources within the Ottoman imperial system.

**Defterdar Aḥmed Pasha’s Reform Program**

Defterdar Aḥmed Pasha was a protégé of Köprülü Fāżīl Aḥmed Pasha, the second of the Köprülü dynasty of reforming Grand Viziers who dominated Ottoman politics in the second half of the seventeenth century. The Köprülü reform program has been discussed elsewhere; here I will summarize its main objectives.18 These were to rein in the power of provincial elites by placing protégés in key positions; to increase central government revenues by preventing provincial elites from skimming the taxes they collected; and to prune the regimental payrolls of men with dubious military function — i.e. the merchants and artisans who had joined the ranks for the economic benefits that membership offered. The overall goal of the Köprülü reformers was to centralize power in the imperial bureaucracy in Constantinople, and so to reverse the trend of the seventeenth century.

Defterdar Aḥmed Pasha was sent by Köprülü Fāżīl Aḥmed Pasha to implement this reform program in Cairo. He was not the first governor to pursue the Köprülü agenda in Egypt: this had been Kara Ibrāhīm Pasha, the personal lieutenant of Köprülü Fāżīl Aḥmed Pasha, who served as governor of Egypt from 1670 to 1672. Kara Ibrāhīm Pasha had arrested two leading beys, Yūsuf Bey Şahr al-Naqib and Kan‘ān Bey, for embezzling several categories of revenue, including the annual tribute to the imperial government (īrsāliyye), the Dashisha endowments and the Ḥaramayn endowments.19 Yūsuf Bey and Kan‘ān Bey had been sent to Constantinople, while their property in Cairo was seized and sold to repay the missing revenues. Kara Ibrāhīm Pasha had then appointed the ağa (commander) and the basçıavuş (senior officer) of the Janissary regiment — soldiers who were

19 The Dashisha endowments were a bloc of endowments founded by the Mamluk Sultans Jaqmaq and Qā‘itbāy and added to by the Ottoman Sultans Selim I and Suleyman the Magnificent. Their revenues supported the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. The Ḥaramayn endowments were another bloc of endowments that supported the holy cities.
closely connected to the governor and who did not have local power bases — as supervisors of the Dashîsha and Haramayn endowments respectively.\(^{20}\)

\(\text{Kara İbrâhîm Pasha’s focus on preventing fiscal corruption by the Egyptian elite and cultivating reliable clients within the Egyptian administration was continued by Defterdar Aḥmed Pasha, the next governor but one. Defterdar Aḥmed Pasha arrived in Cairo on 6 Shawwal 1086 (24 December 1675), and attempted a more ambitious set of reforms that targeted the upper echelons of the financial administration and the regiments. He lasted only a couple of months and failed to push through his reforms. His attempted reforms and subsequent deposition were covered in a rich variety of chronicles: not only the local Egyptian chronicles but also in the imperial court chronicles (\(\text{vekâyi\’nâmes}\)) and in unofficial chronicles written in the capital. Defterdar Aḥmed Pasha’s tenure was the subject of gossip in Constantinople, as it was an embarrassing failure.}^{21}\)

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The various chronicles give slightly different accounts of Defterdâr Ahmed Pasha’s actions, but the principal features of his reform program were as follows. First, he made a series of promotions and reappointments to reward his allies and prepare the ground for reform. This in itself was not unusual and incoming governors often marked their arrival in this way. Second, he attempted an investigation of regimental payrolls, in order to prune them of people who did not fulfill a useful military function, and so deprive them of the salaries and tax exemptions that came with military status. Third, he attempted to impose new taxes on houses and shops, extending the ‘avârız tax regime that had long been regularized in Syria and Anatolia. Fourth, he dismissed the Jewish financial officials working in the Egyptian administration.

The place of the regimental payroll investigation and the new tax regime within the Köprülü agenda is clear. Both reforms aimed to improve the imperial government’s finances by increasing revenues, through the levying of new taxes and the cancelation of tax exemptions, and by cutting government spending on military salaries. The dismissal of the Jewish financial officials requires a little more explanation. The motives for this act were likely mixed. The incident came at the height of the influence in Constantinople of the militant pietist Kadızadeli movement, and the dismissal of Jews from public office fits the Kadızadeli religious agenda. Some of the chronicles describe the move in confessional terms: they talk of the replacement of Jews by Muslims. But at the same time, the removal of these officials was also an instrumental move to prepare the way for a crackdown on revenue diversion. The senior financial positions in Egypt had long been held by Jews: by convention the sârrâfbaşı (head financial official) was the formal representative of Cairo’s Jewish community, in contrast to the situation in Constantinople where this role was played by the chief rabbi. In other words, the

22 For the ‘avârız tax regime in Aleppo, see Wilkins, Forging Urban Solidarities, 19-112.
24 Aḥmad Shalabi, *Awlaḥ al-īshārāt*, 174; Paris Fragment, 57b; *Zubdat ikhtiṣār*, 156. The author of *Tevârîh-i Mıṣr-i Kâhire haṭṭ-i Hasan Paşa* also uses anti-Jewish rhetoric, accusing the Jewish officials of treachery and theft (*ḥryânet ve serîke* [sic]), 107a-107b.
Jewish financial officials were an integral part of the Egyptian establishment, and they were in a position to frustrate Aḥmed Pasha’s fiscal reforms. He replaced them with the former köy dellâlî İbrâhîm Jâewish and the kâtib al-ḥawâla Şâliḥ Efendi: allies from within the Egyptian bureaucracy whom he trusted to cooperate. 26 This was a pragmatic as much as an ideological move.

Defterdâr Aḥmed Pasha’s reform program offended both the regiments and the beys by threatening their incomes and entitlements. As mentioned previously, there was considerable overlap between the regiments and the commercial classes. The payroll investigation and the new taxes hit this group from two sides. Aḥmed Pasha attempted to reduce or cut off their military salaries, while simultaneously increasing taxes on their businesses. Meanwhile, the dismissal of the Jewish financial officials constituted an indirect attack on the beys. The beys controlled the major tax-farms and endowments that were the target of the fiscal reforms of Aḥmed Pasha and his predecessor Ҡara İbrâhîm Pasha. The reformers hoped to prevent the beys from siphoning off funds into their own pockets, and so to increase the proportion of revenue that reached the imperial government in the case of tax-farms, and the holy cities and various public institutions in the case of the endowments. The Jewish officials were the beys’ accomplices within the financial administration: their dismissal signaled Aḥmed Pasha’s intentions and undermined the beys’ ability to carry on as before.

The Deposition

Defterdâr Aḥmed Pasha’s plans became known on 3 Dhū’l-Ḥijja 1086 (18 February 1676). Given the far-reaching implications of the proposed reforms for the interests of Egypt’s elites, it is not surprising that Aḥmed Pasha encountered determined opposition. Immediately, a crowd of soldiers gathered in Rumayla Square, at the foot of the Muqṭṭam hill on which stood the citadel, and demanded that Aḥmed Pasha stand down. 27 The demonstration quickly turned violent when the soldiers noticed a treasury official called ʿAbd al-Fattâḥ Efendi al-Muqṭṭa’ji

26 The köy dellâlî or dallâl al-bîlâd was the official responsible for recording the title and boundaries of plots of agricultural land. The kâtib al-ḥawâla was the official responsible for registering iltizâm (tax-farm) transactions.

27 The dating in Hallâk is slightly different: he claims the soldiers learned of Aḥmed Pasha’s reforms on 5 Dhū’l-Ḥijja, and assembled at Rumayla Square the following morning. Hallâk, Târîh-i Mîṣr, fos. 122a-122b.
descending from the citadel. The soldiers believed that ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ Efendī was an advocate of the reforms, on the basis that he had traveled to Constantinople with a delegation but had not returned with the group, instead arriving later in the entourage of the new governor: they attacked him and cut off his head. Envoys traveled back and forth between the soldiers and the governor trying to negotiate a resolution. But Ahmed Pasha continued to hold out, and eventually the rebels entered the citadel and deposed him by force, placing him under arrest in the house of a local notable. They then appointed Ramadān Bey, one of Egypt’s leading beys, to serve as qā‘im maqām (acting governor), until a new governor arrived. According to the chronicler ʻĪsāzāde, they forced Defterdār Ahmed Pasha to sign a buyuruldu (order) appointing Ramadān Bey to this post.  

The soldiers then sent a petition to Constantinople demanding a new governor. The petition was carried to the capital by a delegation consisting of two members of each regiment, led by Cundī Meḥmed Bey and Deli Süleymān Āğa, the former chief eunuch of the imperial harem who had retired to Cairo, and who was presumably chosen because of his connections at the palace. The petition insisted that the soldiers’ had not rejected the authority of the Sultan, but had simply responded to the illegitimate actions of Ahmed Pasha. The petition employed the idiom of the patrimonial monarchy: the soldiers claimed that Ahmed Pasha had violated the implicit contract between the military and the dynasty, but protested their loyalty and appealed to the beneficence of their Sultan. In this case, the Grand Vizier was not impressed by their entreaty. Cundī Meḥmed Bey and Deli Süleymān Āğa were both exiled to the Aegean island of Limnos, where the latter would die the following year; the soldiers in the delegation were allowed to return to Cairo. However, the imperial government had little choice but to comply with

28 Hallāk specifies that ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ Efendī was the muqāṭaʾji of the imperial granary (enbār-i ʿāmir or enbār-i gilāl). In other words, he was in charge of the granary that received the tax paid in kind from Egypt’s rural provinces and forwarded it to Istanbul and the holy cities. The position was farmed out as a muqāṭaʾa, hence its holder was called a muqāṭaʾajī. Hallāk, Tāriḥ-i Mīrār, fo. 122b.  
29 Most of the chroniclers are silent on the identity of these envoys, but Hallāk identifies them as the Müteferriḵabaş, the lieutenant (katkhudā) of the Çavuşān and the translator (tarjamān). I discuss the significance of this below in the section on the court case.  
30 ʻĪsā-zāde Tārihib, 151.  
31 On the role of retired imperial harem eunuchs in Ottoman Cairo, see Jane Hathaway’s numerous publications. In particular: Politics of Households, 139-64; Beshir Ağa: Chief Eunuch of the Ottoman Imperial Harem (Oxford: Oneworld, 2005); “The Role of the Kızlar Ağası in 17th/18th-century Ottoman Egypt,” Studia Islamica 75 (1992), 141-58.
the petitioners’ demand for a new governor, appointing ‘Abdurrahmān Pasha, at that time serving as governor of Baghdad. Ramadān Bey was confirmed as acting governor by ‘Abdurrahmān Pasha’s musallim (representative), who arrived in Cairo on 17 Ṣafar 1087 (1 May 1676), and he remained in office until ‘Abdurrahmān Pasha himself arrived on 6 Jumādā‘l-akhir (16 August 1676).

The Court Case

During the interim period between the deposition of Defterdār Aḥmed Pasha and the arrival of ‘Abdurrahmān Pasha, the soldiers, in alliance with several beys, pursued a legal strategy in order to limit the actions of future governors. The soldiers and beys did not simply use violence to protect their interests, and nor did they rely solely on an appeal to the Sultan rooted in the patrimonial notion of reciprocal rights and duties. They conceived of the governor’s authority as limited by law, and used Ottoman legal institutions to try to enforce this.

The soldiers and beys used a legal action in al-Dīwān al-‘Āli, one of Cairo’s main courts, to set a precedent about how future governors should behave. The ḥuǧja (legal certificate) issued by the qādī at the conclusion of this legal action has survived at the Prime Ministry Archive in Istanbul. It is written in Arabic, as was usual for the vast majority of the Dīwān al-‘Āli’s records. This ḥuǧja is

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33 Fortunately for them, as their petition failed to convince the Sultan. The soldiers’ legal strategy commenced a mere seventeen days after the deposition of Defterdār Aḥmed Pasha, which was just about long enough for the petition-bearing delegation to have reached Constantinople, but not long enough for news of the exile of Cundī Mehmed Bey and Deli Suleyman Āğa to have made it back to Cairo. When launching their legal strategy, the soldiers did not know the outcome of their petition: rather, they were using multiple strategies simultaneously.
34 BOA, A.DVN, nr. 76/29, 20 Dhū’l-Hijja 1086 (6 March 1676). The corresponding entry in the court register cannot be traced because, as mentioned above, the registers of the Dīwān al-‘Āli have not survived for this period. The earliest surviving register of the Dīwān al-‘Āli dates from 1741-3: Egyptian National Archive, Sijillāt al-Dīwān al-‘Āli, register 1.
35 In the earliest surviving register of the Dīwān al-‘Āli, which dates from the later period of 1741-3, the majority of cases are recorded in Arabic with only a handful of entries in Turkish. The three other seventeenth-century ḥuǧjas from the Dīwān that I have discovered are also in Arabic: Egyptian National Archive, Ḥuǧaj shar‘iyya šādira min mahkamat al-Dīwān al-‘Āli min sana 1030 ila 1272, document 1, 23 Dhū’l-Ḥijja 1030.
a certified copy of the original: the document is signed and sealed at the top by 'Abd al-Baqi, the chief qadi of Cairo, and 'Abdullah, another qadi who held the post of *khilafa b'i'l-Diwân*. The fact that a certified copy of this huja ended up in the archives of the Divan-i Hümâyûn (the Imperial Council) in Constantinople shows that the results of this legal action were communicated to the imperial government.

The Divan al-Áli was located within the citadel compound and was presided over by both a qadi and the governor. In this case, there was no governor because the soldiers had recently deposed him. Therefore, Ramâdan Bey, the acting governor, presided over the case, alongside the judge known as the Qadi al-Diwân. This was the normal procedure: whenever there was no governor present in Cairo, an acting governor chosen from among Egypt’s beys would fulfill his duties including presiding over the Divan. In this case, Ramâdan Bey had been appointed in an unorthodox fashion: not by the *musallim* of the incoming governor but by the soldiers who had forcibly deposed the previous governor and who were now the plaintiffs in this legal action. Ramâdan Bey was an ally of the plaintiffs and this raises justifiable suspicions about the integrity of the process. I discuss this issue in more detail below.

The plaintiffs in the legal action consisted of five beys leading a large group of regimental officers and other officials. The beys were Muhammed Bey, the former governor of the sub-province of Jirja in Upper Egypt, Azbak Bey, the *defterdar* (treasurer), Qânsûh Bey, the former acting governor, Muhammed Bey, the former governor of Jidda, and Áli Bey, who held no particular office but instead held

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37 This may be the Muhammed Bey identified by Holt as Muhammad Abû Qûra, who led an expeditionary force to the Hijaz against the rebellious *sharif* Ḥammûdâ in 1668, and was appointed governor of Jidda for the occasion. Holt, “Beylicate,” 238.
the generic title mir al-liwâ al-sharîf al-sulţânî. The group of regimental officers and officials included twenty-one identified by name, along with a further group of “the great and the small from among the âğas of the Müteferrika and the senior officers of the seven regiments.”

The plaintiffs declared that according to the ancient custom of Egypt – al-‘âda wa‘l-qânûn al-qadîm – no one should meet with the governor, nor with any of his aids, unless he was accompanied by a group of three officials: the lieutenant (katkhudā) of the Çavuşân regiment, the official translator (tarjumân) and the head of the Müteferrika regiment ( Müteferrika bâşçavuş). The current holders of all three of these posts were among the plaintiffs. They went on to emphasize that no one should enter the Dîwân (i.e. the presence of the governor) before these three officials, nor remain behind after they had left.

They then claimed that five individuals had repeatedly flouted this rule and consulted with the governor alone. The people they accused were the former kâtîb al-aytâm Ibrâhîm Efendi,39 the former commander of the Çerâkise regiment Muḥammad, the former mîmâr başçavuş Hasan Āghâ,40 the former qâdî al-Dîwân Mehmed Efendi Türükçizâde, and a man called Muḥammad al-İskandarânî. The plaintiffs claimed that these five men had been warned about their conduct but had continued regardless; they therefore demanded that they be banished from Cairo and that Mehmed Efendi Türükçizâde be barred from serving as qâdî at the Dîwân.

The officers and beys were anxious that people might meet with the governor in secret in order to collude with him against their interests. They had recently decapitated the unfortunate ʿAbd al-Fattâh Efendi after accusing him of just such collusion. The five men whom the plaintiffs accused of violating the established

38 The officers and officials identified by name were: the ružnâmji, the tarjumân (translator) of the Dîwân, the Müteferrika bâşçavuş (the head of the Müteferrika regiment), the âğas of the Gönülleyân, Tüfeçîyân, Çerâkise, Janissary and ʿAzebân regiments, the katkhudâs (lieutenants) of the Gönülleyân, Tüfeçîyân, Çerâkise, Janissary, ʿAzebân and Çavuşân regiments, the başçavuş (head of the lower-ranking officers) of the Janissary, ʿAzebân and Çavuşân regiments, two former katkhudâs of the Janissaries, and two former chief scribes (kâtîb kabîr) of the Janissaries.

39 The kâtîb al-aytâm (scribe of the orphans) was responsible for distributing the pensions paid to the orphans of deceased soldiers and officials.

40 The mîmâr başçavuş (head architect) was responsible for the supervision and taxation of construction in Cairo.
custom were allies of Defterdâr Ahmet Pasha: Hasan Âghâ had been promoted to the position of Mûteferrikâbâşı by Ahmet Pasha on his arrival.\(^{41}\)

The officers and beys were attempting to limit the interactions of future governors with the Egyptian establishment, essentially confining the governor to his own entourage at all times except when supervised by the three officials the plaintiffs named. These were officials whom the soldiers and beys hoped they could rely on to stand up for their interests, report back on anything threatening, and to prevent the governor from hatching intrigues with a small clique of his own choosing.\(^{42}\) It is notable that one of the three named officials was the official translator: he may have been included to ensure that the governor could not avoid full transparency by conversing in Turkish.\(^{43}\)

The plaintiffs did not mention the specific reforms that Defterdâr Ahmet Pasha had attempted, nor did they mention any other potential reforms that might affect their interests. The officers and beys sought to control not what policies future governors might enact, but the processes that governors should follow in arriving at policies. They had a constitutional sensibility: they believed that there were rules by which government should function, and they expected to be represented within the policy-making process.

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\(^{41}\) Tevârih-i Mûr-ı Kâhire haṭṭ-ı Hasan Paşa, 107a.

\(^{42}\) When they were founded in the sixteenth century, the Mûteferrika and Çavuşan were the regiments most closely connected to the Ottoman governor: recruits for the former were drawn from the imperial palace, while the latter was originally formed from members of the defeated Mamluk army who swore allegiance to the Ottoman Sultan and were assigned to serve the governor. However, by the late seventeenth century this connection had weakened considerably: the Mûteferrika had grown powerful enough during the century to assert its independence, and both regiments were thoroughly integrated into the patronage networks and household-based politics of Cairo. See Hathaway, Politics of Households, 36-8; Shaw, Financial and Administrative Organization, 193-6. If the tradition claimed by the plaintiffs was genuine, then its implications may have changed over time, as it became more likely that the holders of the three posts would identify with the local political culture rather than with the governor’s entourage.

\(^{43}\) Many members of the Egyptian political class were Turcophone, but Arabic was more widely spoken. Of course, the members of this class were of diverse backgrounds, and their native languages included Georgian, Abkhazian, Serbo-Croat and Kurdish in addition to Arabic and Turkish. But Arabic was the lingua franca of this society. In any case, the presence of the tarjumân would have ensured that neither Turkish- nor Arabic-speakers would be disadvantaged in any discussions.
The procedure that the soldiers and beys performed was a common legal procedure in Ottoman and other pre-modern shari’a courts. This procedure was called a declaration: *ishhād* or *ikhbār* in Arabic, according to which type of evidence was used. A person or group attended court to make a declaration and have it recorded, thereby establishing a fact. The act of making the declaration with corroborating testimony before witnesses in court, and the qāḍī’s acceptance and recording of the declaration, established legally the truth of the fact. The ḥujjja resulting from this procedure could then be used as evidence in any future dispute. This procedure was typically used in the courts of Ottoman Cairo to establish that a transaction had taken place, that a debt existed, that someone had appointed a person as his or her agent, or that an artisanal guild had certain accepted practices.

The issue at stake in this case was the accepted practices of Egyptian politics: the correct mode of relationship between the Ottoman governor and the provincial military class. The evidence provided was the testimony of a large group of officers and beys: the practitioners of Egyptian politics. The authority to which the officers and beys appealed was custom: *al-‘āda wa l-qanîn al-qadîm*. The officers and beys testified that the requirement that the three named officials supervise all meetings involving the governor was the ancient custom of Egypt. Established custom was considered authoritative and enforceable in Ottoman

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44 The statement of the officers and beys is described in the ḥujjja as *khabar* (report) rather than *shahāda* (testimony): they *akhbārū* rather than *ashhādū*. According to Islamic legal theory a statement had to meet certain criteria to be considered *shahāda*. In addition to certain formal qualities regarding the words used, the statement had to be a first-hand report of something the witness had seen with his own eyes or heard with his own ears: not something that he supposed or deduced based on other evidence. The object of *shahāda* therefore had to be a specific event that involved specific people and occurred at a specific time and place: it could not be a state of affairs or an opinion. A statement concerning the ancient customs of Egypt could not meet these criteria and so was considered *khabar* rather than *shahāda*. *Khabar* did not carry the same conclusive weight as evidence as *shahāda*, but it was still influential. When a *khabar* statement was introduced in courts in Ottoman Cairo, it was usually made by a large group of people to give it added weight, as opposed to the two adult Muslim witnesses that were necessary for *shahāda* to be effective. For the criteria applicable to *shahāda* according to an Ottoman manual of Ḥanafī law and its commentary, see ‘Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Muḥammad Shaykhzādah, *Majma‘ al-anbuh sharh Multaqāl-‘abbur* (Beirut: Dār al-kutub al-‘ilmīyya, 1998), III: 257-66. This edition includes the text of the manual that was the subject of Shaykhzādah’s commentary: Ibrāhīm al-Ḥalabī’s *Multaqā al-‘abbur*. 
legal practice, as long as it did not contravene Islamic legal doctrine. Indeed, the theoretical justification for the imperial law promulgated by the Ottoman Sultans, in a context where Islamic law was held to be supreme, was that it codified customary practice. This was reflected in the word used for imperial law: qānūn, which, as the phrase used by the plaintiffs in the case discussed here shows, also meant custom. The ambiguity between these two meanings of qānūn is significant and will be discussed in more detail below.

**Aftermath**

As this court case was a declaration (ikhbār) rather than a lawsuit (da‘wā), the five officials accused by the officers and beys of breaking the rule were not called to defend themselves, nor did the qāḍī order any punishment of them. Rather, the ḥujja simply states that the proceedings were written up and preserved in order that they may be referred to when necessary: kutiba dhālika ḏaṭṭan li‘l-wāqi‘ li yurja‘ ‘ind al-ḥtiyāj ilayh. The purpose of the court case was to establish the fact that, according to the law, the governor could only conduct government business when supervised by the lieutenant of the Çavuşan, the Mûteferrikâbâşı and the translator. The ḥujja produced by the court case was to serve as evidence of this fact. The document states that a copy was made in the official register of the Dīwān al-‘Ālî, to ensure that it was publicly available for reference. The existence of a certified copy of the ḥujja in the archives of the Dīvân-i Hümâyûn (Imperial Council) reflects its dissemination to the imperial government in the Ottoman capital.

One of the chronicles tells us that the five officials whom the soldiers and beys accused of breaking the rule they described were banished to Ībrîm in Nubia. But this was an executive action: according to the chronicle it was accomplished through the issuance of a buyuruldu by the acting governor, rather than a qāḍī’s judgment. The role of the court in the case studied here was to make law, not to enforce law.

We don’t know whether future governors obeyed the rule laid out in this ḥujja. It would be surprising if all did: the tensions between governors and soldiers that this incident illustrates continued. We know that the imperial government in Constantinople was not happy with the outcome of this dispute. As mentioned above, when Cundî Mehmed Bey and Delî Süleymân Āğâ arrived bearing the

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soldiers’ petition, they were promptly exiled to Limnos. A couple of years later, Ramaḍān Bey, the acting governor appointed by the soldiers who presided over the Diwān in the court case, was appointed to accompany the ırsāliyye, the annual transfer of tax revenues, to the capital. Protecting the convoy on its journey was an important job that was usually assigned to an Egyptian bey. In this case, however, the selection of Ramaḍān Bey served an ulterior motive: upon arrival in Constantinople he too was exiled to Limnos, and a ferman was sent to Egypt ordering the seizure of his property.46 In this way, the imperial government sought revenge for his crucial enabling role in the deposition and subsequent legal action.

The Rule of Law

We can justifiably wonder whether the legal process in this case was fair. One of the men presiding over the Diwān al-ʿĀlī – the acting governor Ramaḍān Bey – had been put there by the officers and beys who brought the case. Alongside Ramaḍān Bey sat a qāḍī, and it was this qāḍī who was responsible for evaluating the evidence presented and for issuing the ḥujja. But in the presence of a large group of armed and powerful men who had recently violently deposed the governor and murdered one of his allies, and in the temporary absence from Cairo of representatives of the imperial government, would the qāḍī have felt able to follow procedure and perform his role objectively? This is a valid question, for which there is no conclusive answer. The ḥujja itself does not betray any coercion or intimidation, but that, of course, is the nature of legal documents, which necessarily present whatever took place as if it happened in accordance with legal procedure.

Given these uncertainties, in what sense does this incident illustrate an emerging rule of law? It does not demonstrate that a robust rule of law had been established at that point in time: no single incident could demonstrate that. What the incident illustrates is the emergence of a concept of the rule of law which saw the relationship between the imperial government and its provincial servants as governed by law, and which consequently made law central to political struggles. The first point is that legal institutions and legal procedures were the means by which this stage of the dispute was conducted. An Ottoman court allowed a challenge to the governor’s authority to be brought before it, and its procedures, derived from the manuals of fiqh that structured legal practice throughout the

46 Deftedar Sarı Mehmed Paşa, Zübde-yi Vekayiat, 87.
early modern Muslim world, enabled the complainants to assert their conception of correct governance.

The second, important point is that the law was the focus of attention. The soldiers had already demonstrated their ability to defy the governor’s wishes, and to effect gubernatorial change, through brute force. They did not, however, think that violence was sufficient to protect their interests on a lasting basis. In the court case, the soldiers and beys sought to ground the justification for their actions and their privileges in law. The terrain on which the negotiation over the governor’s powers was carried out, and the language in which it was articulated, was that of law.

The legal domain that was being contested in this case was that of qânûn. As mentioned previously, the word qânûn meant custom as well as imperial law, and the phrase employed by the officers and beys, which paired qânûn with the synonym for custom ʿada, appears to indicate the former usage. But the ambiguity between these two meanings was central both to the historical understanding of qânûn-as-law and to the issue at stake in this court case. Historically, qânûn-as-law had been conceptualized as the codification or legitimization of accumulated custom. But how, in practice, did custom become qânûn-as-law? In other words, what gave a particular custom the authority of law? Changes in the mechanism by which custom became law are central to the emergence of the rule of law I am tracking here.

Meanwhile, the subject of this dispute – the correct relationship between the Ottoman governor and his provincial servants – was an issue of public law. Public law fell squarely within the domain of Ottoman qânûn-as-law. The provincial kânûnnâmes issued by the conquering Sultans of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries were compendiums of public law: they laid out in detail the duties and responsibilities of governors, regiments and other officials in particular provinces, alongside provisions for taxation.\(^\text{47}\)

\(^{47}\) Public law was not a term used in the seventeenth-century Ottoman Empire, but is useful here as an analytical category. I do not intend it to correspond exactly the scope of public law today; but only to identify the aspects of government and administrative law mentioned in this paragraph. The example of the scope of qânûn most relevant to this article is the Egyptian kânûnnâme of 1524, published in Ömer Lutfi Barkan, \textit{XV ve XVInci Asrarda Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Zirai Ekonominin Hukuki ve Mali Esasları} (İstanbul: Bürhaneddin Matbaası, 1943), 355-87.
The officers’ and beys’ claim that the customs of Egyptian politics dictated that the governor should only conduct business when supervised by the lieutenant of the Çavuşan, the Müteferriḵabaşı and the translator was an attempt to define an aspect of public law. Their claim was an assertion that they had the right to determine what qanûn-as-law was, if they could provide evidence. This case, then, illustrates a significant shift in the conception of where lay the authority behind public law and qanûn-as-law. Tezcan argues that the late sixteenth century saw the Sultan’s authority to issue qanûn weaken. In the era of the great kânûnnaḥes, the Sultan’s word was law: despite the theoretical fiction that the kânûnnaḥmes codified custom, it was their promulgation by the Sultan that gave them authority.\(^\text{48}\) By the late sixteenth century, however, many writers argued that the Sultan was bound by the qanûn of previous Sultans, in particular by the qanûn of Meḥmed the Conqueror. Such writers held that existing kânûnnaḥmes could be embellished or developed, but not reversed. Tradition now had genuine authority to constrain the actions of the Sultan, to the extent that it had been written in the form of a kânûnnaḥme.\(^\text{49}\)

Our case suggests that by the late seventeenth century conceptions of qanûn had moved further along the trajectory suggested by Tezcan. Provincial political figures could now assert what qanûn-as-law was based on their understanding of tradition and custom, regardless of whether what they asserted had ever been formally promulgated by a Sultan.\(^\text{50}\) This took place in a broader seventeenth-century

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\(^{48}\) This does not imply that the Ottoman kânûnnaḥmes were not really based on custom. Customary practice was a vast field, which included many mutually contradictory customs. It was promulgation by the Sultan which gave a particular custom the authority of law.

\(^{49}\) Tezcan, Second Ottoman Empire, 49-59; for the relationship between Ottoman qanûn and custom see also Tezcan, “The Kanunname of Meḥmed II: A Different Perspective,” in The Great Ottoman-Turkish Civilization, ed. Kemal Çiçek et al. (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye, 2000), III: 657-65.

\(^{50}\) It is not clear whether the tradition cited by the plaintiffs in this case had ever been formally promulgated. It was not in the Egyptian kânûnnaḥme of 1524; indeed the Müteferriḵa corps was not established until the year 964 AH (1554-5). It could have been promulgated at a later date through a ferman, or it could have been a practice that emerged organically at some point. It is noteworthy that in Hallâḵ’s account of the deposition of Ahmed Pasha it is these three officials who shuttle back and forth between the governor in the citadel and the crowd of soldiers in Rumayla Square, suggesting that they did have a recognized role as intermediaries. The question whether or not this tradition had been formally recognized previously is not of vital importance to the
context in which texts labeled kânûnnâmes were written by bureaucrats and scholars, rather than in the name of the Sultan. Qânûn was becoming a legal literature rather than a set of statutes, and its authority no longer depended on official promulgation. It was becoming a common law, the authority of which was not doubted but the content of which was subject to ongoing debate. In this sense, although its sources and texts were very different, the field of qânûn was beginning to resemble fiqh, which was also an ongoing debate about the correct interpretation of a law with unquestioned authority.

The fact that the officers and beys were able to prove what qânûn was in an Ottoman-Islamic court also suggests a different way of thinking about the relationship between qânûn and sharî'a. Theoretically, in any pre-modern Muslim context, the sharî'a was supreme. Historians have demonstrated that the Ottomans conceptualized qânûn as subordinate to the sharî'a, in the sense that qânûn supplemented and developed the provisions of the sharî'a, but did not contradict its core principles and doctrines. In this case, qânûn was subordinate to the sharî'a in a different sense. The officers and beys were able to prove what qânûn was by relying on the procedures of the sharî'a. These were legal procedures that served to evaluate claims and to establish what was legally true, which were drawn from the procedural chapters of fiqh texts, and which defined the practice of courts across the Ottoman Empire and in the pre-modern Muslim world in general. The epistemology of the sharî'a determined what qânûn was; or, more precisely, when somebody made a claim about what the qânûn said about a particular matter, he or she had to do so within the epistemological framework provided by the sharî'a.53

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51 For example, the kânûnnâme written by Tevkî-i Abdurrahmân Pasha in 1087 AH (1676-7). This has been published: “Osmanlı kânûnnâmeleri,” Millî Tetebbu’lar Mecmûası 1 (1331 AH), 497-544.


53 We can put this and the previous observation together to suggest that qânûn was increasingly approached and understood using the intellectual framework and tools of the
This court case does not represent an established rule of law: it is neither a final nor a comprehensive statement of the bounds of government. What it illustrates is a constitutional sensibility: a consciousness that law constrained the actions of the government and an understanding of public law as external to the government. Events elsewhere in the seventeenth-century Ottoman Empire suggest a similar consciousness: Tezcan shows that the Janissaries involved in the deposition of Sultans sought fatwas (legal opinions) from prominent ulema justifying the depositions on the grounds that the deposed Sultans had deviated from the law. The case discussed here demonstrates the role of courts and legal procedures, rather than the legal opinions of jurists, in this emerging constitutional mode of political engagement.

This constitutional sensibility put law at the center of the struggle between the governor and the soldiers. The officers and beys wanted to mold the law to their political advantage: they were self-interested users of the law rather than objective legal thinkers. The context of political violence was immediately below the surface during the court case, which took place only seventeen days after the deposition of Deferdar Ahmed Pasha and the murder of 'Abd al-Fattah Efendi al-Muqatta'i. The same was true of the fatwas accompanying the depositions of Sultans discussed by Tezcan. With the political stakes high and the potential for violence ever present, it would be naïve to imagine that the muftis issuing fatwas and the qâdis issuing judgments in such situations were guided by legal principles alone and were not affected by political calculations and an instinct for self-preservation.

The officers’ and beys’ determination to bend the law to their purposes demonstrates the law’s significance: while it was not robust enough to be immune to political manipulation, it was too important to be ignored and so was necessarily politicized. The right way to understand the extra-legal maneuvering around the court case by both sides – the soldiers’ placing of their ally Ramağan Bey on the bench before launching their court case; the possible intimidation of the qâdi; and the imperial government’s later punishment of Ramağan Bey – is as a form of judicial politics. Judicial politics are a familiar feature of systems where the law plays an important role in structuring and constraining

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jurist; a consequence of the increasing prominence of jurists and of what Tezcan calls jurists’ law during the seventeenth century. For Tezcan’s account of the rise of jurists’ law, see Second Ottoman Empire, 14-45.

54 Tezcan, Second Ottoman Empire, 6, 220. For a broader discussion of the role of law in seventeenth-century political discourse in the Ottoman capital, see ibid., 59-78, 156-75.
government. The salience of the liberal/conservative divide on the US supreme court bench is only the most prominent modern example; others include the Mubarak regime’s manipulation of the Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court, and the reorganization of Turkey’s state prosecution service in response to the 2013 corruption inquiry targeting members of the previous government. In the USA, the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Republic of Turkey the law constrains government, albeit to very different degrees, and is a central component of political discourse. The reason that judicial politics are significant in these countries is that the law cannot be ignored: it must be manipulated. Egypt in 1676 saw a similar process: a struggle over the meaning and interpretation of the law that was fought by both the government and other social actors both within the courts through legal procedures and outside the courts through less scrupulous means. A crude judicial politics was the inevitable accompaniment of the emerging rule of law.

**Conclusion**

The seventeenth century saw a transition in which Ottoman government was increasingly subjected to legal checks and oversight: a conception of the rule of law emerged as a model for the relationship between the Sultan and the ruling class that exercised his power. This change accompanied the growing power and assertiveness of certain sections of the ruling class – the military regiments and provincial notables. These groups pushed a legal idiom of governance as a means of consolidating their rising status and protecting their interests and privileges. It coexisted with a patrimonial idiom, which assumed an unwritten contract between the Sultan and his servants, and which had a longer history. While Tezcan portrayed this legal idiom through an analysis of the historiographical and political writing of the period, this article has used court records to analyze the role of legal institutions and legal procedures in brokering political struggle, showing how the courts were involved in the interpretation of public law.

The rise of the legal idiom as an alternative to the patrimonial idiom reflected the broadening of the ruling class. The more distant the make-up of the military regiments became from the sixteenth-century model of a corps of the Sultan’s palace-trained slaves, the less relevant the patrimonial notion of a contract of allegiance seemed. Many of the soldiers in Cairo’s regiments in the late seventeenth century had never been trained in any imperial institution, let alone the schools of the palace. Most were free-born; many of those who were slaves were not
*kapı kulu* (slaves of the Porte) but rather belonged to the leaders of Egypt’s great households. They had bought their way into the ranks using their own or their patrons’ capital. The legal idiom suited the impersonal nature of their relationship with the imperial government better than the fiction of a personal bond of fealty.

The increasing role of law in structuring the relationship between the imperial government and its provincial servants was therefore a key aspect of the transformation of the Ottoman Empire from a patrimonial monarchy into an early modern bureaucratic state. The process involved not only the recognition that the Sultan’s authority over his provincial servants was governed by rules. It also involved a new understanding of who had the authority to create and interpret those rules. A public law emerged which, unlike the fifteenth- and sixteenth-century *şânûnûnâmes*, was external to the Sultanate. The legitimacy of this public law was still rooted in custom, but the authority to define it no longer rested with the Sultan, and was instead claimed by other sections of the ruling class. This process also involved the political empowerment of courts: the *shari‘a* courts whose *qâdis* had long adjudicated disputes among Ottoman subjects. The procedures of these courts became the arbiters of disputes over the interpretation of public law, and enabled provincial soldiers, officers and notables to assert and validate their understanding of their relationship with the imperial government.

*The Deposition of Defterdâr Ahmed Pasha and the Rule of Law in Seventeenth-Century Egypt*

Abstract ■ This article examines the deposition of the Ottoman governor of Egypt by Cairo’s soldiers in 1676, and a subsequent court case, in order to illustrate the increasing importance of law and legal institutions in Ottoman politics during the seventeenth century. I show that in the court case, the soldiers sought to constrain the actions of future Ottoman governors by establishing legal limits on their authority. I argue that the soldiers displayed a constitutional sensibility: a belief that the conduct of government was bound by rules, and that courts were the place to establish and enforce these rules. This allows us to see the frequent rebellions in the seventeenth-century Ottoman Empire in a new light: as part of an emerging concept of the rule of law that was central to the empire’s transformation from a patrimonial monarchy into an early modern bureaucratic state.

Keywords: Ottoman Egypt, *Shari‘a* Courts, Rebellion, Köprülü reforms
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